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Abstract
This paper considers the conditions that are necessary for market discipline to
complement prompt corrective action (PCA) by the authorities in handling
problem banks. We initially consider precisely what market discipline means in
this context, who exercises it and the preconditions that are necessary for it to
operate effectively. We explore the incentives that are necessary for PCA and
market discipline to reinforce rather than cancel each other and in particular
consider the limits to market discipline in this context from corporate governance
and from difficulties in valuation. While our analysis is primarily aimed at
advanced countries, we also examine problems in emerging markets and how
deposit insurance arrangements might conflict with the aims of both PCA and
market discipline.
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Markkinakurin merkitys vaikeuksissa olevien
pankkien käsittelyssä
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 21/2003
David T. Llewellyn – David G. Mayes
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Keskustelualoitteen aiheena on kysymys, millä ehdolla markkinakuri voi tukea
viranomaisten aikaista puuttumista (Prompt Corrective Action, PCA) vaikeuksissa
olevien pankkien toimintaan. Aluksi tarkastellaan markkinakurin käsitettä ja sen
tehokkaan toiminnan edellytyksiä. Sen jälkeen tutkitaan kannustinjärjestelmiä,
jotka ovat välttämättömiä, jotta aikaiset viranomaistoimet ja markkinakuri voisi-
vat heikentämisen sijasta vahvistaa toisiaan. Erityisesti tarkastellaan pankkien
omistajavalvonnan ja taseen arvostusongelmien markkinakurille asettamia rajoja.
Vaikka analyysi lähinnä koskee kehittyneitä talouksia, käsitellään myös kehitty-
vien markkinoiden erityisongelmia ja sitä, kuinka talletusvakuutusjärjestelmät
voivat heikentää viranomaisten toiminnan ja markkinakurin tehoa.
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This paper addresses the issue of how to ensure that market discipline and the
authorities’ requirements for Prompt Corrective Action and resolution in the event
of failure act as complements and reinforce each other. A central theme is that
PCA based on a set of explicit rules reinforces the role of market discipline.
Equally, enhanced market discipline arrangements should both enhance the
credibility of PCA and provide valuable information to supervisory authorities in
their decisions to apply PCA. The complementarity of PCA and market discipline
is central to the paper.
The underlying theory of market discipline is clear: well-informed creditors
and, in some cases, rating agencies have the resources, incentives, expertise and
market knowledge to monitor banks, and that their behaviour will discipline banks
through various equilibrating market price and quantity adjustments. However,
the precise nature of functioning market discipline and its prerequisites are
somewhat unclear.
Four key issues arise in considering the role and effectiveness of market
discipline:
(1) what are the precise channels of market discipline and the distinction between
direct channels (prices, quantities and managerial incentives) and policy
channels (eg how supervisors respond to market signals),
(2) the required conditions for market discipline to work effectively and
efficiently,
(3) the nature of the impediments (both market and policy-induced) to the
effective and efficient operation of market discipline, and
(4) what regulatory and supervisory agencies can do to enhance the role of
market discipline and raise its effectiveness.
By the nature of the contracts that banks issue (incomplete contracts on both sides
of the balance sheet) and the potential systemic implications of hazardous bank
behaviour, banks need to be monitored. Four central questions arise:
(1) who are the relevant monitors?
(2) what are their respective incentives?
(3) might intervention of various kinds by the official sector have the unintended
consequence of impairing the role of other monitors (eg debt-holders) because
it blunts the latter’s incentives?
(4) how are the roles of the various monitors related to each other and are there
positive or negative feedbacks?8
In this context the paper begins by considering the concept of Stakeholder
Monitors.
Because of the ambiguous and unclear nature of market discipline, the paper
derives a set of pre-conditions for market discipline to operate effectively. These
relate to, inter alia, the information that has to be disclosed, the structure of the
monitoring system, the ability of stakeholders to act, the nature of corporate
governance, the incentives from the regulatory system and previous experience. In
practice there are many impediments to the operation of market discipline in
banking that are not addressed, for example, in the Third Pillar of the Basel 2
proposals. The paper focuses on those impediments that relate to the interaction of
supervisors and related authorities’ behaviour and the actions of the other
stakeholders in the ‘market’. The paper seeks to establish at the outset which
‘markets’ are being considered – subordinated debt, corporate control, for
example.
Although the issue of moral hazard emanating from aspects of deposit
insurance and anticipated public assistance in the event of difficulty is well
known, the paper also considers similar issues relating to various incentive
structures both internal to the bank and of external market participants. These
include the extent to which the private sector might react to increased supervisory
scrutiny by easing its own monitoring, and the degree to which supervisors can
use market signals in directing the focus of their activity in these circumstances.
The paper focuses on the contradictions that emerge in the tackling of problem
banks that are actually or imminently in breach of capital adequacy or other risk-
limiting measures. The nature of the Prompt Corrective Action obligations for the
authorities laid down in advance will affect the nature of market discipline both
before difficulty becomes apparent and when it is revealed. Revelation of
difficulty is not only a disciplining device at the time but also in prospect. There
is, however, a potential conflict between market valuations based on transactions
that need to be undertaken rapidly and the longer-term valuations that would
apply if a bank had to go into liquidation under insolvency. It is important that
market discipline assist stability of the financial system as a whole and not worsen
it, as it can in some circumstances. The analysis considers isolated events of bank
difficulty and more general problems associated with ‘herding’ and the economic
cycle.
In suggesting ways to help lessen these potential conflicts the authors come
down in the direction of credible rules for prompt corrective action (and
ultimately resolution if a bank becomes insolvent) rather than for discretion. In
addition to the issues of transparency for the market, the same transparency needs
to apply to actions by the authorities and their accountability for the actions taken
(or not taken). The proposals seek to move the balance of responsibility first
towards the management of the banks themselves, and second towards the large
and well-informed shareholders and creditors and away from excessive reliance9
on the authorities beyond their realistic abilities. In suggesting an appropriate
balance it is necessary to take account of the limitations of market discipline, from
insufficient information, differences between private and social costs and benefits,
freeriding and extent of expertise. The fact that market signals exist does not mean
that stakeholders and bank managements, in particular, respond to them. A key
issue, therefore, is how to create appropriate incentive structures.
2 What is market discipline?
While market discipline is a widely-used term in the context of supervising and
regulating banks, it is frequently not precisely defined. Lane (1993) in his seminal
work defines market discipline as “financial markets providing signals that lead
borrowers to behave in a manner consistent with their solvency”. The new Basel
proposals (Basel Committee, 2003), in presenting the ‘Third Pillar’ (which is
labelled ‘Market Discipline’) leap straight into a discussion of disclosure. The
availability of adequate information is certainly a necessary condition for markets
to operate effectively but it is not a sufficient criterion on its own.
Market discipline is a general concept, which can be applied to all activity and
normally incorporates both price and quantity adjustments. While there are many
special features that affect its application in the field of banking, this does not
alter the basic idea. Firms operate in a number of markets (Bollard et al, 1993)
some of which are internal but for our purposes it is worth discussing simply
product markets and factor markets. Normally regulators would be satisfied that
society’s objectives are being met if there is widespread and ‘fair’ competition in
these markets. An element of consumer protection will also usually be added, as it
is difficult for the consumer to be adequately informed about the particular
product to make a good choice and it is easy for firms to misinform. In a
competitive product market firms enter, alter their market size and exit on the
basis of the price and broadly defined quality of the products. In banking the
product market is heavily restricted. Entry is controlled by the authorities, the
range and nature of products is controlled and most importantly in the current
analysis exit is also controlled. The authorities are not prepared to see the
unfettered collapse of banks, largely because this could damage confidence in the
financial system as a whole and inhibit the efficiency of operation of the
economy. In essence, and because of externalities, exit is controlled because the
social cost of bank failure exceeds the private costs (Goodhart et al, 1999).
In any case the nature of the ‘products’ that banks provide, particularly in
taking deposits and making loans, is very different from much other activity.
Borrowers have difficulty taking their business elsewhere, while depositors can
usually do so with all too much ease for the stability of the system. Discipline on10
banks through the product market is therefore severely impaired in many
countries and this in itself should be a cause for concern to regulators in designing
and supervising the operation of the system.
Attention in the banking industry therefore tends to focus on factor markets
and on the capital market in particular. We can debate whether deposits should be
regarded as inputs and loans as outputs or what the form of the product is in terms
of the services provided, but the primary focus for market discipline is on the
provision of financial capital. However, particularly since banking is a service
industry, the labour market is an important ingredient in the process. In
investment banking, teams can be bid away from one bank to another and the
business will tend to move with them. The operation of the labour market is
particularly important for senior management. One of the key features governing
how problem banks behave relates to the expectations of senior management over
their future. In the market for corporate control, the senior management may be
part of what the acquirer wishes to purchase or they may be precisely what the
acquirer wishes to dispose of as being the main reason for poor performance of
the company compared to its potential.
The functioning of the market for corporate control is likely in many cases to
be the most important in handling a problem bank. The existing owners retain
control of the bank up to the point of insolvency (and appointment of the FDIC as
receiver in the United States), although their actions may be increasingly
circumscribed as the problems worsen. If a bank can be bought on the open
market either directly or through an open bid for the holding company then the
discipline on the bank from the ‘market’ will be much more effective. If the bank
has a mutual structure, is largely private in character or part of a large industrial
group (or owned by central or local government) then these pressures will operate
very differently and generally with less (if any) power and effectiveness. The
incentive structure faced by decision-makers within these banks is quite different
from those faced by the generality of publicly-quoted banks. If there is a board of
directors, independent of management and responsive to shareholders, that can be
expected to replace the top management in the face of poor performance,
incentives will be much sharper. Insisting on the appointment of independent non-
executive directors who will be liable in the prudential management infractions, as
in New Zealand, should heighten the focus (Mayes, 1997).
It is because of all the possible constraints on the other markets that there has
been a focus in the literature on the market for subordinated debt (see Evanoff and
Wall, 2000, for a survey). If all banks were required to hold a proportion of their
capital in the form of subordinated debt that was actively traded and needed to be
rolled over frequently, then it might be possible to get some fairly clear market
signals that would act as a disciplining device on the bank. Emphasis here is given
to the mandatory nature of subordinated debt because, if subordinated debt issuing
is voluntary, market signals may become inefficient. For instance, a rise in the11
cost of debt faced by a bank which comes to be perceived as more risky, may
simply reflect a liquidity premium because the bank chooses to issue no
subordinated debt. In this case, it is not clear whether the rise in the price of debt
represents a true risk premium or a liquidity premium. Even so, as Bliss and
Flannery (2000) point out it is necessary to have more than a clear market signal
for it to act as a disciplining device. People have to be able to act on it in a way
that makes bank managements respond. Agents must be both able and willing to
act. Thus the vital ingredients for market discipline are twofold: that there should
be an open active market with sufficient well-informed players that the resulting
‘price’ signal reflects a general view. Second that the corporate governance of the
bank and the financial system should be such that this signal is translated into
action. Given the constraints we have mentioned affecting markets that impinge
on banks it is likely to be a combination of effects on all of the ‘stakeholders’ in
the bank that is required to offer effective market discipline.
To reflect this two-sided concept of both the market signal and the willingness
to act, Llewellyn (2002a) develops the concept of a ‘stakeholder monitor’.
Stakeholders, as the name implies, have something at stake in the relative success
or failure of the firm. Those who participate in the process of observing the
behaviour of the firm and forming judgements in the light of it can be described as
‘monitors’. Such monitors may have access to both market and private
information. Combining these ideas, ‘stakeholder monitors’ are all those agents











The list is not necessarily complete. The group clearly includes borrowers because
they may be heavily affected as a bank gets into difficulty. Loans may be called in
rather than rolled over and new business may become difficult.12
3 Pre-requisites for effective market discipline
There is almost universal agreement that the role of market discipline in regimes
for systemic stability should be enhanced. This is reflected, for instance, in Pillar
3 of the Basel 2 Accord. However, its precise meaning and the necessary
requirements and pre-requisites for it to operate effectively are not always clear
and are seldom made explicit. It is something of a ‘black box’. However, it is
possible to identify at least eight necessary conditions for market discipline to
work effectively, which between them offer a framework for a rather closer
understanding of the contents of the box. All are necessary but none alone is
sufficient.
(1) Relevant and accurate information about the status of banks needs to be
publicly available on a timely basis to all stakeholder monitors (SHMs).
(2) There needs to be a sufficient number of SHM groups who are capable of
analysing the information made publicly available.
(3) SHMs need to have clear incentives to monitor the behaviour of banks and to
incur the costs of doing so. This may include the possibility of losing money.
As put by Morgan and Stiroh (2000), effective market discipline requires that
investors first consider themselves to be at risk in the event of insolvency. The
potential benefits of monitoring need to exceed the costs.
(4) A sufficient cohort of SHMs needs to adjust their behaviour on the basis of
relevant information about the status of the banks in which they have an
interest.
(5) SHMs need to respond rationally to relevant information which, for instance,
implies that they are not subject to the same errors or misperceptions as the
banks being monitored. In a world of herding this can be a demanding
requirement as, under some circumstances, the euphoria that leads banks into
hazardous positions may also be shared by those undertaking monitoring.
There is a hint of this in Birchler and Maechler (2001). This raises the general
issue of how well market participants process the information available to
them.
(6) Such rational responses need to lead to equilibrating changes in market
quantities and/or prices (eg the supply and pricing of debt available to banks).
(7) Bank managers need to have incentives, and the ability, to respond to these
market changes, or must be conscious of the potential threat of such changes
because, for instance, they would affect the competitiveness of the bank with
respect to the business it is undertaking with depositors, other suppliers of
debt, shareholders and borrowers. In particular, managers need to respond to
actual or threatened rises in the cost of deposits, debt and equity capital. For
instance, if banks issue only a small amount of subordinated debt, changes in13
its price may be insufficient incentive for managers to alter their behaviour
simply because they are not sufficiently costly to the bank. The truth is that
we know remarkably little about the incentives and motivations of bank
managers and how they respond to incentives. Having said that, we do know
that internal managerial incentives can be dysfunctional by, for instance,
relating managerial rewards to volume without incorporating risks, by the
substantial turn-over and movement of managers, and by herd behaviour.
Managers may also have incentives to adopt a very short time horizon in their
decisions. It is also well established (eg Billett et al, 1998) that banks may
react to adverse market signals by shifting into less-disciplinary funding
sources. There is also a host of principal-agent issues to consider in this area,
particularly involving the role of the board of directors. In this context, the
Basel Committee emphasises the importance of good and effective corporate
governance arrangements for effective market discipline to operate.
(8) It follows from the above seven conditions that the market should efficiently
incorporate information about risk into prices, ie that prices truly reflect risk.
In essence, market discipline ultimately works through price and quantity signals
as in any other market. This includes the cost of capital, cost of deposits and other
forms of debt financing, the supply of deposits and debt, and the market in
corporate control where inefficient managers may lose control of the bank.
However, there may be impediments to the signalling process and insufficient
incentives to respond to those signals that do emerge. Applying a different
approach, Hämäläinen et al (2003) make a useful distinction between a
recognition phase and a control phase in the operation of market discipline.
Two immediate conclusions follow from this simple paradigm. First, market
discipline will not work effectively if any of these eight routes are impeded
(sometimes as the unintended consequence of regulation of one sort or another)
or, for any other reason, do not operate. Second, the role and power of the market
can be enhanced by various mechanisms to strengthen each of these routes. In this
latter respect, three examples can be cited:
– a high priority can be given to the timely publication of relevant information
about the status of banks; the Basel Committee stresses the need for sufficient,
comparable, accurate and relevant market disclosure.
– factors that reduce the incentives of SHMs to conduct monitoring can be
removed or eased, and
– mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that there is a sufficient number of
SHMs who know they would lose in the event of a bank failure.
One of the central challenges in regulatory and supervisory arrangements is to
improve the conditions under which market discipline can operate effectively and14
efficiently which implies addressing each of the eight components within the
black box.
There are several reasons why, in practice, market discipline may not operate
effectively with lack of transparency and of relevant, accurate and timely
information being the starting point. A perception that a bank will be rescued in
the event of distress (perhaps because it is judged to be TBTF) diminishes the
incentives for effective market monitoring. The key issue is that a no-bailout
policy must be credible for it to be effective.
The moral hazard attached to badly constructed deposit insurance schemes
has been well established. If deposit insurance is (or is perceived to be) total, or is
mis-priced, banks have an incentive to take excessive risk because risk-taking is
effectively subsidised, and depositors may have an incentive to seek high-risk
banks offering a higher expected rate of return on deposits. Similarly, the
perception that official agencies conduct effective monitoring and intervention
(perhaps based on an assumption of superior information) may also weaken the
incentives for others to conduct costly monitoring in the belief that they are only
duplicating monitoring which is already being undertaken by an official agency.
Market participants might also judge that official supervisors have the advantage
of economies of scale and also information advantages that private market
participants do not have. The position has been put in this way by Soifer (1991):
“What matters to (fund managers) about capital and models is not whether they
think (capital and risk models) are adequate but rather whether the bank satisfies
the requirements of regulators and rating agencies … Regulators have access to
internal data which market participants do not. Hence, from the standpoint of
capital adequacy, public disclosure of validation data is largely irrelevant. The
people who need to know already have access to the information with which they
will formulate their findings upon which analysts and investors have no choice but
to rely ... ”
Several contributions can be made to enhancing the effectiveness of market
discipline including more demanding and relevant disclosure requirements. For
market discipline to work effectively, disclosure should be based on common data
as between different banks. The incentives of SHMs to conduct monitoring can be
increased through, for instance, a mandatory subordinated debt capital
requirement, and limits set on deposit insurance. Also, a regime of credible PCA
within a SEIR (Structured Early Intervention and Resolution) framework (and
most especially a credible commitment to no bail-outs) can contribute to several
of the routes within the paradigm outlined above. The requirement for behaviour
to be influenced by information includes arrangements for effective corporate
governance mechanisms. The requirement that behaviour leads to changes in
quantities and prices can be addressed also by, for instance, a mandatory
subordinated debt rule. Whether bank managers respond to market signals15
depends  inter alia on competitive conditions in the banking industry and the
internal incentive structures within the bank.
4 Market discipline and problem banks
Within the framework we have established, we now turn to the issue of market
discipline and intervention arrangements with problem banks. Bank supervisory
and regulatory systems have an armoury of weapons available for handling
problem banks. These fall into two groups:
– measures designed to stop banks becoming problems in the first place, and
– measures designed to resolve problems.
These amount to mechanisms designed to reduce the probability of bank failures
(though not to zero), and to minimise the cost of those bank failures that do occur.
The first group includes:
– capital adequacy requirements in an attempt to prevent the realisation of
expected and unexpected risks from having too drastic consequences for the
viability of the bank;
– supervisory reviews to ensure that the banks’ risks and risk management
methods are being adequately addressed, and
– market discipline through disclosure and the need to issue subordinated
securities that are marketed.
The second group includes:
– a raft of requirements for Prompt Corrective Action to resolve the problem at
an early stage before it threatens the viability of the bank
– procedures for exiting the bank and limiting the losses, often through
insurance, should corrective action prove impossible or ineffective.
The incentives for behaviour by banks, their shareholders, boards, creditors,
customers and the authorities, with respect to the avoidance and resolution of
problems are affected by both groups of measures. Not only do the two groups of
measures interact but their incentives may conflict. Thus for example if a
competitor expects to be able to pick up a problem bank at a discount in the
resolution process that will affect its willingness as a creditor to push the bank all
the way into insolvency. The pricing of the problem bank in the market will be
affected by the willingness of the supervisor to disclose the bank’s problems. The16
effectiveness of the insurance scheme will affect the willingness of the insured to
exercise much discipline through the market. Such schemes do not have to be
explicit. If bank creditors expect to be bailed out through the sorts of
unconditional guarantees that were issued during the Finnish and Swedish
banking crises at the beginning of the 1990s, then the pricing of the securities they
hold in the bank will not give a clear signal.
Eisenbeis and Wall (2002) suggest that the balance of change in regulation
during recent years has been to increase the emphasis on the first group of
measures – avoiding bank failures/problems – rather than trying to decrease the
costs of those that do occur. As they emphasise, the prevention of failure tends to
increase the burden of responsibility placed on bank supervisors compared to the
other SHMs we have outlined. If, on the other hand, the aim is minimising the
cost of failures then far more of the banks’ SHMs are at risk.
There is a downward slope of difficulty down which problem banks tend to
slide and which require increasingly drastic action to be taken. Although
categorisation is arbitrary, we can distinguish four main circumstances for
‘problem’ banks that have encountered losses:
(i) Banks whose capital is inadequate from a market (or their own) point of view
but who meet regulatory standards
(ii) Banks that breach regulatory capital standards but are generally thought to be
solvent
(iii)Banks that breach regulatory capital standards and are economically but not
legally insolvent (net worth is negative)
(iv) Banks that are insolvent and can no longer continue trading without a capital
injection.
Banks that lie in the first group do not require regulatory intervention but their
plight will have been reflected in market prices and eventually in their ratings.
Here we would expect private sector solutions. The bank might be able to
continue by raising more capital from its owners and making drastic
improvements to the business – cutting costs, selling profitable non-banking or
banking parts of the business to improve both the capital position and the cash
flow. More likely, they will find themselves in merger or takeover talks.
Banks in the remaining groups require action by the authorities. Asser (2001)
labels them jointly as banks in ‘distress’, although terminology tends to differ
among authors. The Basel Committee (2002) refers to ‘weak’ banks “one whose
liquidity or solvency is or will be impaired unless there is a major improvement in
its financial resources, risk profile, strategic business direction, risk management
capabilities and/or quality of management.” (p. 1) This is a much more difficult
definition from our point of view as it entails a judgement and not necessarily one
that is reflected clearly in an observable market price. Banks in Group (iv) have17
reached the point of closure or taxpayer bailout, everything else having failed (or
the shock being too large). There are some circumstances, as with Barings, where
the shock (loss) is so large that the bank goes straight into Group (iv) without any
prior warning. In those cases a market solution may still be possible because it has
not previously been tried. It is well known that a bank is worth more alive than
dead (Guttentag and Herring, 1983) even though its value may be negative. In any
case, whatever the value of the bank is will be reflected in its purchase price.
Banks in Groups (ii) and (iii) can continue trading at least for a while even if
what they are effectively doing is realising their assets at steadily deeper discounts
in order to pay off depositors and uninsured creditors who are unwilling to bear
the increased risk. The crucial difference between the two groups is that in Group
(iii) there is no longer enough value in the bank to pay out all the creditors and
depositors if they should wish it. Such a bank is not legally insolvent, as it is still
able to meet its day to day obligations. In some environments it could continue
almost indefinitely in this state, for example, if the market believes that the bank
will be bailed out should it ever fail to meet its obligations. However, banks that
are in this Group, either where there is no guarantee or where the market’s belief
in the implicit guarantee is erroneous, are in effect trading at the expense of the
uninsured depositors and creditors and the underwriters of the insurance fund.
Such beliefs are frequently held in the TBTF case or if the market thinks that too
many banks are under strain at one time for the authorities to start letting them fail
(the too many to fail argument). The window in which the junior or subordinated
debtors will receive anything much in the way of payout in the event of failure is
quite small as the costs of insolvency normally mop up quite a substantial part of
the value of the company, all of which is set off against the claims of the creditors
in reverse order of seniority. Mayes et al (2002) and Mayes and Liuksila (2003)
argue that banks in Group (iii) should be treated in the same way as banks in
Group (iv), as they are only viable through the contingent claim on the taxpayer.
Our starting point is that taxpayers should not have to pay for bank insolvency any
more than they pay for the insolvency of any other nonfinancial company. There
is no clear reason outside the concerns for systemic stability that the authorities
should offer a subsidy to banking rather than other sectors nor to insolvent banks
at the expense of those that are trading more prudently or were lucky enough to
avoid the shock.
Our principal focus here is on Group (ii), where the bank has positive value in
a market sense but the authorities require it to improve its risk
position/management and capitalisation in order to give adequate confidence
about its ability to withstand future shocks. We are dealing in this case with banks
that have been unlucky or poorly managed not with those that have disregarded
either supervisory rules or have been subject to fraud. In those cases the
authorities have a requirement to act irrelevant of the views of the market. In this
group both the market and the authorities have something to contribute to the18
resolution of the problem. One would no more wish to concentrate monitoring and
responsibility for action on a presumably risk-averse insurer than one would on
shareholders who may have little to lose from taking further large risks (Miller,
1999).
However, as things stand at present, in most countries we do not have the
information available to tell whether a bank is Group (ii) or Group (iii). In the US
the FDIC is compelled to close a bank once its capital ratio falls to 2 percent. The
assumption in this case is that all such banks will be very clearly in Group (iii)
and hence closing them and taking them away from their owners and into
administration will not deprive their owners of any value because their shares will
already be worthless. If the system is to be fairer and more efficient in its
operation, banks in Group (ii) need to be assessed not so much in terms of their
regulatory capital but in terms of their net worth or economic value.
Not only does the assessment of the capital position of the banks for
regulatory purposes not normally relate to the market value of the bank but a bank
meeting the Basel 1 criteria could be insolvent (as was the case with SKOP Bank
in Finland in 1990, a year before it revealed its insolvency to the authorities).
Basel 2 may help where it improves the measurement of risk. But where many
assets in the balance sheet are at book value or other artificially high levels when
a bank is in difficulty, regulatory capital will underestimate the threat of
insolvency and the urgency of the need for action by the market and the
authorities alike. It is very obvious from the rating agencies’ attitude to the
adequacy of bank capital, that from their point of view a bank starts looking
increasingly risky well before it gets close to breaching the regulatory limits
(Ridpath, 2003).
Mayes and Liuksila (2003) argue that the authorities should switch the focus
of their analysis of the capital position of the bank from compliance with
regulatory capital rules to net worth as soon as the regulatory boundary has been
breached.
5 Prompt corrective action
Within this paradigm there is a strong and direct case for a credible PCA regime.
A key component of any set of regulatory and supervisory arrangements is the
nature, timing and form of intervention by supervisory agencies in the event of
financial distress with banks (Llewellyn, 2002b). A key dimension in this is the
impact interventions have on future incentive structures of banks and their
appetite for risk. The central issue is when intervention is to be made. The
experience of banking crises in both developed and developing countries indicates19
that there should be a well-defined strategy for responding to the possible
insolvency of financial institutions.
In this regard, a major consideration relates to rules versus discretion in the
event of bank distress, ie the extent to which intervention should be circumscribed
by clearly-defined rules (so that intervention agencies have no discretion about
whether, how and when to act), or whether there should always be discretion. The
obvious prima facie advantage for allowing discretion is that it is impossible to
foresee all future circumstances and conditions for when a bank might become
distressed and close to (or actually) insolvent. It might be judged that it is not
always the right policy to close a bank in such circumstances.
There are, nevertheless, strong arguments against allowing such discretion
and in favour of a rules approach to intervention including those embodied within
a PCA programme. First, it enhances the credibility of the intervention agency in
that market participants, including banks, have a high degree of certainty that
action will be taken. Second, allowing discretion may increase the probability of
forbearance, which usually eventually leads to higher costs when intervention is
finally made. Third, with discretion there are potential hazards associated with
risk-averse regulators who might be disinclined to take action for fear that it will
be interpreted as a regulatory failure. There will be a temptation to allow a firm to
trade-out of its difficulty, which amounts to the regulator ‘gambling for
resurrection’. Fourth, and this was relevant in some countries which recently
experienced banking distress, it removes the danger of undue political interference
in the disciplining of banks and regulated firms. Experience in many countries
indicates that supervisory authorities face substantial pressure to delay action and
intervention. Fifth, and related to the first, a rules approach to intervention is
likely to have a beneficial impact on ex ante behaviour of financial firms. A rules-
based approach, by removing any prospect that a hazardous bank might be treated
leniently, has the advantage of enhancing the incentives for bank managers to
manage their banks prudently so as to reduce the probability of insolvency or
distress.
Put another way, time-inconsistency and credibility problems can be
addressed through pre-commitments and graduated responses with the possibility
of over-rides. The case for a graduated and structured response is that there is no
magical capital ratio below which an institution is in danger and above which it is
safe; potential danger gradually increases as the capital ratio declines. A policy of
Prompt Corrective Action may specify graduated intervention by regulators with
pre-determined responses triggered by capital thresholds. Several countries have
such rules of intervention (Basel Committee, 1999).
The need to sustain the credibility of supervisory agencies creates a strong
case against forbearance. The overall conclusion is that there should be a clear
bias (though not a bar) against forbearance when a bank is in difficulty. While
there should be a strong presumption against forbearance, and that this is best20
secured through having clearly-defined rules within a PCA framework, there will
always be exceptional circumstances when it might be warranted in the interests
of systemic stability. However, when forbearance is exercised the regulatory
agency should, in some way or another, be made accountable for its actions.
A key issue in the alignment of incentives in PCA is the objectives of the
authorities. If, as in the US, the principal objective is the minimisation of the
potential loss to the deposit insurance fund, then there will be substantial
alignment among the aims of the SHMs. There is a slight misalignment even in
the US case as the FDIC succeeds to the claims of the depositors in the event of
failure and moves to the top of the priority list. The groups with the sharpest
incentives under PCA will be those who lose first under failure, namely,
shareholders, who are wiped out, the subordinated and uninsured
creditors/depositors and the employees who fear for their jobs. In many EU
countries the deposit insurance fund has no such ability to affect the corrective
action applied by the bank and has to take its place along with other unsecured
creditors. Indeed, since it holds a contingent liability it can do relatively little to
protect its position, as it has no particular access to market pressure. Other
creditors have the ability to withdraw or at least increase the price of their lending
along with the risk. In some cases deposit insurers can increase the price in the
form of increasing premiums to those whose risk has risen but in others,
premiums are uniform across categories of banks.
It would be better for market discipline, as Eisenbeis and Wall (2002) suggest,
if there could be rather wider incentives for the contributors to the deposit
insurance fund. In the event of failure the surviving banks have to replenish the
fund. If they have a continuing interest in the performance of the fund then they
will also have an incentive to see the programme of PCA work. Thus for example,
if the fund has a low level of claims such banks could be entitled to a rebate on
their premiums each year. Since other banks are the most likely injectors of
capital into a bank in difficulty, there is then an incentive for them to find the
least-cost route since they may end up paying one way or another. If the bank fails
they pay, if the hole is larger rather than smaller they pay more, if they acquire
they pay and if a competitor acquires the bank in difficulty they may pay if their
competitive position is worsened. Such neat alignments are more difficult in
smaller countries, where major domestic banks may be excluded by the
competition authorities from making an acquisition under PCA, or where
resources may be such that only foreign banks can finance the acquisition.
Nevertheless, exposing the taxpayer alone to the primary loss is unlikely to
maximise SHM incentives.
A major discrepancy in the system comes through the pressures for delay
rather than prompt action. Bank losses tend to be cyclical and indeed under Basel
2 the pressures on them may be procyclical, especially if ideas, such as dynamic
provisioning that can mitigate the tendency, are not permitted or encouraged.21
There is therefore strong pressure, particularly in times of more general stress to
the banking system, to try to prolong action until the economy picks up. At that
point firms may be able to service impaired loans again, the costs of capital may
fall and the ability of others to take on problem banks will improve. The
authorities may have similar systemic concerns that the revelation of problems in
the short run and indeed attempts to resolve them through shrinking under PCA,
may run the risk of exporting a more general debt-deflation spiral. Growing a
bank back to better capitalisation rather than shrinking it may have a variety of
attractions for its owners and managers.
As the Japanese example makes clear, it is by no means obvious that deferring
the problem reduces the overall cost. Indeed the uncertainty for those involved
with contingent liabilities may both increase the cost and impair the chance of the
economic recovery on which the whole strategy is based.
6 The role of market discipline
Monitoring is not only conducted by official agencies whose specialist task it is.
In well-developed regimes, the market has incentives to monitor the behaviour of
financial firms. The disciplines imposed by the market can be as powerful as any
sanctions imposed by official agencies. The disciplining role of the markets
(including the inter-bank market) was weak in the crisis countries of South East
Asia in the 1990s. This was due predominantly to the lack of disclosure and
transparency of banks, and to the fact that little reliance could be placed on the
quality of accountancy data provided in bank accounts. This is not an issue for
less developed countries alone. For instance, market discipline has not operated
efficiently in Japan due largely to insufficient financial infrastructure (weak
accountancy rules, inadequate disclosure etc).
Several parties are potentially able to monitor the management of banks and
other financial firms: owners, bank depositors and customers, rating agencies,
official agencies, and other banks in the market. In practice, excessive emphasis
has been given to official agencies. The danger in this is that a monopolist
monitor is established with many of the standard problems associated with
monopoly power. There may even be adverse incentive effects in that, given that
regulatory agencies conduct monitoring and supervision on a delegated basis, the
incentives for others to conduct costly monitoring may be weakened.
The merit of increasing the role of market discipline is that large, well-
informed creditors (including other banks) have the resources, expertise, market
knowledge and incentives to conduct monitoring and to impose discipline. A
further advantage to having agents other than official supervisory bodies monitor
banks is that it removes the inherent danger of having it conducted by a22
monopolist with less than perfect and complete information with the result that
inevitably mistakes will be made. A monopolist supervisor may also have a
different agenda than purely the maintenance of financial stability. It has been
noted that “Broader approaches to bank supervision reach beyond the issues of
defining capital and accounting standards, and envisage co-opting other market
participants by giving them a greater stake in bank survival. This approach
increases the likelihood that problems will be detected earlier ... [it involves]
broadening the number of those who are directly concerned about keeping the
banks safe and sound” (Caprio and Honahan, 1998). Strengthening the role of
market discipline may also limit the danger of official forbearance. In addition,
Caprio (1997) argues that broadening the number of those who are directly
concerned about the safety and soundness of banks reduces the extent to which
insider political pressure can be brought to bear on bank regulation and
supervision. As neither the market nor regulatory agencies are perfect, the obvious
solution is to utilise both with neither having a monopoly of wisdom and
judgement.
7 Limits on market discipline
While market discipline is potentially powerful, it has its limitations. This means
that, in practice, it is unlikely to be an effective complete alternative to the role of
official regulatory and supervisory agencies:
– Markets are concerned with the private costs of a bank failure and in principle
reflect the risk of this in market prices. The social cost of bank failures, on the
other hand, may exceed the private cost and hence the total cost of a bank
failure may not be fully reflected in market prices.
– The private cost of market monitoring and information collection may exceed
the private benefits to those undertaking it.
– Market discipline is not effective in monitoring and disciplining public sector
banks.
– ‘Free-rider’ problems may emerge.
– The market is able to price bank securities and inter-bank loans efficiently
only to the extent that relevant information is available, and in many cases the
necessary information is not available. Disclosure requirements are, therefore,
an integral part of the market disciplining process.
– It is not self-evident that market participants always have the necessary
expertise to make risk assessment of complex, and sometimes opaque, banks.
In addition, there are some areas within a bank (eg its risk analysis and control
systems) where disclosure is not feasible.23
– In some countries, markets in debt of all kinds (including securities and debt
issued by banks) are limited, inefficient and cartelised.
– When debt issues are very small it is not always economic for rating agencies
to conduct a full credit rating on a bank’s subordinated debt.
The conclusion, therefore, is not that market monitoring and discipline can
effectively replace official supervision, but that it has a powerful role, which
should be strengthened within the overall regime.
8 A problem of assessment
At the point in the process of decline in a bank that the authorities become
concerned about its possible failure in the sense that the insurance fund may be
called upon to pay out insured depositors, the nature of the valuation also changes.
The exposure of the insurance fund depends upon the ultimate value of the bank
under insolvency, a value that may not be revealed for many years, as
insolvencies are typically very slow. The stock of bad assets acquired in the
Finnish banking crisis of 1991/2 has still not been finally disposed over ten years
after the event. The problem thus applies even if the authorities decide on a
bailout and acquire the bad assets through purchase and assumption or through
loans to a continuing bank.
The value will therefore remain hypothetical until the process is completed.
Thus at the time of taking decisions, whether under PCA or at the point of
insolvency, those involved have to use other valuations of the bank. Technical,
book valuations are likely to be least helpful in these circumstances, as they give
no real indication of the price of the various alternatives. Market valuations are
likely to be the most useful. There is a temptation to argue that because it is very
difficult to value various of the assets of the bank and indeed some of its
contingent liabilities, that this route should not be followed. Ideally, marking to
market would provide the most helpful valuation for both potential private sector
solutions and for the authorities in trying to decide when to intervene. One
objection placed on mark to market is that it places too harsh a valuation on the
bank’s assets as there will inevitably be some element of a fire sale valuation, as
the time for decision-making is short. However, those involved are entitled to take
a different view if they are prepared to take a longer time horizon than the market
as a whole and hold the assets to maturity or at least until the market picks up.
This is precisely what a central bank will do in trying to value collateral. Since it
is unlikely to face short-run liquidity constraints itself it can wait to resell assets.
However, the LOLR facility is designed only to come into effect when the market24
is not working and hence to offer short-run lending at a margin above market
rates.
Marking to market is clearly appropriate if the bank’s alternative in these
circumstances is to realise its assets in an effort to meet the demands caused by
withdrawing depositors and creditors. If such a valuation can be used then it will
push the SHMs, including the authorities, the shareholders and the creditors into
action earlier. The value of the bank as a going concern will reflect the
expectation that the authorities will intervene and close the bank as soon as the
apparent net worth on their assessment of the current valuations reaches zero.
Mayes et al (2001) and Mayes and Liuksila (2003) argue that the intervention
point should be as near to zero as possible, so that the degree to which a haircut
has to be applied to the claims on the bank to restore solvency is small.
1
In these circumstances the authorities still have to make a valuation of the
bank in order to apply the appropriate haircut to restore solvency. Since the bank
is not going to be made insolvent, the value under insolvency will always remain
hypothetical. Nevertheless, if the authorities have under-valued the bank and
applied too harsh a haircut, the shareholders and creditors who have thereby been
harmed will have a legitimate claim on the authorities for compensation.
Similarly, if the authorities impose too small a haircut, they will expose
themselves to the residual loss, since one requirement of the scheme is that the
authorities would have to guarantee the new bank established immediately after
the haircut, if they are to avoid a run and existing and new customers are to have
confidence. Hence either way round the authorities have a strong interest in
obtaining accurate valuations of the bank in the short run.
In the event of a problem that is initially small there may be a fairly extended
period where these economically meaningful, more market based valuations can
be obtained. During this time the provisions of PCA will be in force if the bank
has breached the regulatory capital requirements. Of course, if the problem is
immediate and the issue has to be resolved over the weekend then the assessments
will be that much cruder. Either way, there is a strong incentive to try to bring
accounting conventions and valuation rules as close to market values at possible
so that the operation of the market can be eased and the intervention of the
authorities matched as closely as possible to those market valuations.
We noted earlier, the advantages of the feedback from market valuations to
supervisory actions. In so far as regulatory capital is not a good measure of net
                                                
1 MHL (2001) suggest a simple three step framework for handling insolvent banks that could lead
the market to believe that there will be no bailout with taxpayers money. 1) A requirement to
intervene early (when the net worth of the bank falls to zero). 2) A takeover of the bank by the
authorities from the existing owners and a writing down of the claims on the bank (following the
absolute priority principle) sufficient to restore positive net worth. 3) Reopening of the bank
without interruption of trading, with a government guarantee of the new entity, under
administrative management until such time as private sector ownership can be reinstated.25
worth, particularly because it can be a lagging indicator of the bank’s actual
position, the market valuations will be helpful to the authorities for gearing up
supervisory attention and the sort of regulatory inspection necessary for a formal
triggering of the provisions of PCA. The better the quality of the information
about the bank, the more likely it is that market prices will reflect the position in
prospect.
9 The role of deposit insurance
There have been several recent studies that help illuminate the relationship
between market discipline and PCA through the medium of the deposit insurance
arrangements. While the deposit insurance fund does not necessarily have to be
the agency responsible for ensuring PCA, the coincidence of incentives makes this
attractive. Certainly, as Mayes and Liuksila (2003) point out, it is very difficult to
get  prompt or indeed any corrective action if there are multiple authorities
involved, particularly if they run across borders. Gruben et al (2002) and Beck
(2003) consider two related issues: the extent to which the absence of market
discipline (often due to the existence of deposit insurance) induces banks into
risky behaviour; and the difference that the existence of market discipline makes
in determining the impact that financial liberalisation has on banks adopting
higher risk profiles. The analysis is based on an empirical investigation of six
countries with different deposit insurance regimes: Canada, Mexico and Argentina
(Gruben et al, 2002) and Brazil, Germany and Russia (Beck, 2003). This is only a
limited sample of countries and, therefore, care is needed when generalising to
other countries. Nevertheless, subject to this reservation, the analysis is instructive
and yields useful insights. Gruben offers three main conclusions. First, in
countries where market discipline arrangements are weak (Canada and Mexico)
lending risks rose significantly in the post-liberalisation period. Second, when
market discipline is imposed by depositors, banks did not behave hazardously and
risks did not rise in the post-liberalisation period (Argentina). In this respect, the
results are in line with those of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) who find
that, while financial liberalisation increases the probability of a banking crisis, the
probability is reduced the stronger are the institutional pre-conditions for
liberalisation and market discipline. Third, there is a correlation between
depositor-imposed discipline and the predisposition of banks towards risky
behaviour. The overall conclusion is that liberalisation increases risk when market
discipline is weak.
Beck is concerned with the incentive structure rather than the performance of
the deposit insurance system in encouraging action prior to insolvency. He argues
that the Russian case is actually perverse in that the authorities delayed rather than26
encouraged action and when they have intervened have tended to do so “in favour
of shareholders and managers who have taken the decisions that led to fragility in
the first place.” (p. 112). Germany, on the other hand, by having a completely
private deposit insurance system encourages existing banks to find solutions for
problem banks because they know they will ultimately have to pay anyway.
In the case of Mexico there also seems to be a perversity in that, with the one-
way-bet option of deposit insurance, weakness in asset quality seems to have
induced more substantial deposit growth.  It is not clear what the causal
mechanism is. The normal model of the moral hazard associated with deposit
insurance operates through interest rates, in that banks are able to finance high-
return and risky loans by inducing a higher deposit inflow by offering a slightly
higher rate of interest on deposits but without the incorporation of the full risk
premium which is unnecessary as depositors are protected.
Gruben’s analysis is helpful in that it illustrates what happens when one
changes the prevailing system to one where the market has a greater role to play
in a less restricted system. Two qualifications are made: first, about the nature of
increased risks in the post-liberalisation period, and second, a distinction needs to
be made between the stock-adjustment effect and the steady-state effect of
liberalisation. With respect to the nature of risks in the post-liberalisation period,
the subsequent rise in the risk profile of banks may not be a reflection of ex ante
intentions to take more risk, and banks may not necessarily be aware they are
taking more risk. One of the characteristics of liberalisation (though it depends
upon the precise nature of the liberalisation process and the nature of the controls
that were previously in force) is that it is often followed by a period of rapid bank
lending and a herding instinct towards balance sheet growth as a business strategy
following the abandoning of regulatory-imposed restraints. This has been found in
many countries including in the Nordic region prior to the Nordic banking crises
of the early 1990s. Higher risk profiles ex post may simply reflect the same
behaviour as in the past becoming more risky when all banks undertake the same
behaviour simultaneously and on a larger scale than previously. Unanticipated
changes in either the banking or economic environment following liberalisation
(such as a sharp acceleration in asset-price inflation) can make given bank
portfolios inherently more risky than was previously the case. This raises the very
important point that the timing of the changes in the existing regime to one where
early action, including early exit, and no taxpayer bailout is the expected norm, is
crucial. If banks are already known to be weak, an increase in the likelihood of
failure could generate a run on the banking system in general, as in Indonesia in
1997.
A distinction needs to be made between liberalisation that induces banks to
choose to take more risk, as opposed to liberalisation which makes the
environment more risky and banks to under-estimate the risks they take. In this
way, the risk profile of banks may increase either because they knowingly choose27
to take more risk or because, for various reasons, they underestimate and under-
price the risks they are taking. Simply because risks are observed to rise after a
period of liberalisation does not in itself mean that liberalisation raises the risk
appetite of banks. Here is a second ‘black box’: what are the precise mechanisms
that operate between liberalisation and subsequent bank distress? In particular, to
what extent is subsequent bank distress the result of banks adopting a greater risk
appetite, the environment becoming more risky, or simply banks underestimating
and under-pricing risks perhaps because they misunderstand the new market
environment?
A second distinction needs to be made between the stock-adjustment effect of
liberalisation (the impact on behaviour as the banking system moves from a
controlled to a more liberalised environment – the transition period) and the
steady-state characteristics of a liberalised financial system. There are many
reasons why the risk profile of banks might rise in the transition period: banks
expand their loan portfolio very sharply in the immediate aftermath of
liberalisation and risk analysis systems are often not suited to the new
environment; a balance sheet growth momentum develops in a phase of
generalised euphoria following liberalisation; rapid asset growth appears to be
very profitable in the short-run; as all banks expand loans simultaneously, and
herd behaviour emerges, behaviour that might involve acceptable risk for
individual banks acting alone, becomes excessively risky when all banks behave
in the same way; liberalisation usually implies more competition and the erosion
of economic rents which in itself may induce banks into more risky behaviour
than in the pre-liberalisation period.
In the stock-adjustment phase (ie during the period immediately following the
liberalisation process) uncertainty is created, as financial firms are unfamiliar with
the characteristics and management requirements of the new regime. Previously
protected institutions need to adapt behaviour though this may occur only with a
time lag. New behaviour patterns need to be learned. Some mistakes during the
process of liberalisation occur because banks do not adjust quickly enough to the
requirements of the new regime. Behaviour which is appropriate under one regime
may be inappropriate in another (see Llewellyn, 2000 and Benink and Llewellyn,
1994 for a more formal discussion). At the same time, official supervisory
arrangements may not adjust sufficiently to the new environment. Bisignano
(1998) argues that this represents a combination of ‘excess momentum’ by the
private sector (banks) and ‘excess inertia’ on the part of supervisory authorities.
Thus if the market discipline and PCA are not introduced in a balanced manner,
the pressure from the market could drive the authorities towards bailouts and
forbearance rather than away from them.
The reservation about the conclusions that fragility follows liberalisation is
that the characteristics of the immediate stock-adjustment phases (the transitional
phase of moving from one regulatory environment to another) do not necessarily28
apply once the new steady-state has been reached. Many of the banking crises that
have emerged following a period of liberalisation have been associated more with
the uncertainties and mistakes during the transition phase rather than the inherent
characteristics of a liberalised financial system. This can be seen in the now
profitable banking systems in Nordic countries following the extreme distress
experienced in the immediate post-liberalisation period.
10 Market discipline in practice
Birchler and Maechler (2001) presents an interesting case study of the discipline
imposed by bank depositors in Switzerland. The main hypothesis underlying the
empirical tests is that “depositors exert market discipline by monitoring their
banks and by withdrawing uninsured deposits whenever performance of their
bank is no longer satisfactory. Bank fundamentals should thus help to explain the
amount of uninsured deposits a bank is able to attract.” (emphasis added). The
authors use quantity indicators (supply of bank deposits) rather than price
indicators. The key conclusions may be summarised as follows:
– contrary to conventional wisdom, depositors do seem to monitor their banks;
– uninsured savings deposits react to business conditions and deposits are
withdrawn when the fundamentals of the bank deteriorate;
– depositors responded to changes in the Swiss deposit protection system;
– depositors were found to be sensitive to institutional differences across
banking groups, and
– state guarantees have tended to weaken market discipline.
While these conclusions suggest that market discipline does work when the
conditions are propitious, one also suggests that depositors do not always respond
rationally (see condition (5) in the paradigm outlined in section 3). The episode
concerns how depositors responded in the event of a sharp rise in bank lending in
a bubble period. Depositors did not seem to be concerned about the banks’ strong
credit growth during the real-estate bubble before 1994 though they become
concerned once the bubble had burst. This is a reservation to the efficiency of this
form of market discipline. There is ample evidence that problems build up during
a period of sharp asset growth most especially when this is associated with real-
estate euphoria. As put by the authors: “The fact that investors use their
information, does not imply that they use it correctly. … Market discipline thus
does not shield banks and depositors from irrational swings in general market
discipline.” This, of course, is not an argument against creating an enhanced role
for market discipline in the overall regulation and supervision of banks. It does,29
however, suggest that total reliance cannot be placed on it, and that all the
mechanisms within the paradigm outlined at the outset need to be strengthened.
The encouraging aspects of the conclusions are that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, depositors are in a position to monitor banks and to respond to bank-
specific risks, that quantity indicators rather than price signals have a role in
potentially disciplining banks, and that, when conditions are conducive, market
discipline can be a viable disciplining mechanism on banks. Combined with the
evidence from Boyle et al (2002) – that banks in Denmark were realistic in
disclosing their potential losses during the banking crisis and did not try to hide
losses in the hope that the problem might ease in the future – gives some
confidence for the way in which more market discipline backed up by more
disclosure might operate in practice.
11 PCA and market discipline in practice in weak
regimes
Aristobulo de Juan (2002) considers the applicability of PCA to countries with
poor banking supervision, and the necessary conditions for PCA regimes to be
feasible and effective. While accepting the case for PCA, and welcoming the
FDICIA arrangements, the author argues that final judgement must be suspended
until they have been put to a real test. Care is needed when transplanting models
such as PCA and FDICIA to other countries where the conditions are different
and the necessary prerequisites for success might be absent. Country-specific
considerations always need to be taken into account when considering the
relevance and suitability of such regimes. These regimes may be suitable only for
a small number of developed countries. In many other countries the necessary
prior conditions for a FDICIA and PCA regime are not in place. Beck (2003) is
rather more optimistic in this regard.
A major practical constraint is that availability and reliability of data are often
insufficient for PCA. PCA will not work effectively when supervision is
inadequate and unreliable and when, in other ways, supervisory arrangements are
weak. Aristobulo de Juan emphasises in particular the accuracy of data on the true
value and quality of bank assets (and hence of capital) which in many countries is
weak. In many countries the stated value of bank assets (and hence capital) is
something of a fiction. This is often the result of questionable accounting
procedures and norms.
On the basis of experience in many countries, de Juan outlines several pre-
requirements and pre-conditions for an effective PCA to be implemented:30
– accurate and transparent data on the true position of banks and, in particular,
on the quality of their assets;
– as strong supervision is a precondition for effective PCA, there need to be
rigorous supervisory arrangements including on-site inspections;
– a prerequisite for an efficient assessment of solvency and good asset
classification is a good and properly implemented accounting system which,
according to the author, is conspicuously absent in many countries;
– sound authorisation conditions for banks;
– effective reporting to supervisors;
– adequately resourced and suitably remunerated supervisory agencies;
– a political will to be realistic about the status of banks and their true financial
predicament coupled with a political willingness to act decisively and timely;
– institutions and mechanisms in place for effective resolution of problem
banks.
These are demanding conditions and, for this reason, the author concludes that
PCA may in practice not be feasible at the current time for a large number of
countries.
12 Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper has been to consider the required conditions for
market discipline to operate effectively and efficiency. A set of questions was
outlined at the outset. Five general conclusions emerge from our analysis:
(1) market discipline does work when the conditions are propitious and when it is
allowed to work;
(2) conversely, market discipline frequently does not work when the required
conditions are not met and when regulatory intervention has perverse effects
on the required conditions for market discipline to play its role,
(3) governments and supervisory agencies have the capacity to impede the
operation of market discipline but also have powers to enhance its role: the
former should be minimised and the latter maximised,
(4) deposit insurance has the effect of lowering the incentives for market
discipline to operate, and
(5) the absence of market discipline imposes avoidable costs.
More widely, we can suggest:31
– the relationship between market discipline and intervention arrangements in
the event of bank distress can be complementary or contradictory;
– PCA strategies and market discipline are essentially complementary and a
credible PCA regime has the power to enhance the role of market discipline;
– there is an overwhelming case for both enhanced market discipline and PCA
in creating conditions for stable financial systems;
– PCA regimes need to be viewed as part of a more general policy of enhancing
the role of market discipline;
– the evidence is that, if the conditions are appropriate, market discipline can be
an effective part of an overall regime designed to bolster systemic stability;
– conversely, if the necessary conditions are absent, market discipline fails to
work effectively;
– as recognised in the proposed Basel 2 Capital Accord, information disclosure
and transparency are key requirements for market discipline to operate
effectively;
– there are, nevertheless, limits to what can be expected from market discipline
and hence it is not an alternative to effective regulation and supervision by
official agencies.
While the proposed Basel 2 Capital Accord makes reference to the need for early
intervention in the event of bank fragility or potential fragility, and Pillar 3
focuses on the role of market discipline, it remains to be seen how much emphasis
is given to these in practice. There is also a danger that some aspects of Pillars 1
and 2, and most especially the detailed and prescriptive nature of some of the
rules in Pillar 1, might in practice weaken market discipline mechanisms.32
References
Asser, T.M.C. (2001) Legal Aspects of Regulatory Treatment of Banks in
Distress. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
Basel Committee (1999) A New Capital Adequacy Framework. Publication
no. 50, June.
Basel Committee (2002) Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks.
Report of the Task Force on Dealing with Weak Banks, March.
Basel Committee (2003) The New Basel Capital Accord. Consultative
Document, April.
Beck, T. (2003) The Incentive Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and
Bank Failure Resolution – Concepts and Country Studies. Chapter 4 in
Mayes and Liuksila (2003).
Benink, H. – Llewellyn, D.T. (1994) Deregulation and Financial Fragility: A
Case Study of the UK and Scandinavia. In The Competitiveness of
Financial Institutions and Centres in Europe. D. Fair and R. Raymond, eds.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Billett, M.T. – Garfinkel, J.A. – O’Neal, E.S. (1998) Market Discipline,
Regulatory Discipline, and the Price of Risk in Banking. Journal of
Financial Economics, 48, 333–358.
Birchler, U.W. – Maechler, A.M. (2001) Do Depositors Discipline Swiss Banks?
Working Paper 01.06 Schweizerischen Nationalbank.
Bisignano, J. (1998) Towards an Understanding of the Changing Structure of
Financial Intermediation. Basel, BIS mimeo.
Bliss, R.R. – Flannery, M.J. (2000) Market Discipline in the Governance of US
Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing. Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Working Paper, WP-2000-3.
Bollard, A. – Harper, D. – Mayes, D.G. (1994) Product Market Flexibility:
Concepts and Indicators. London: HM Treasury.33
Boyle, G. – Bartholdy, J. – Stover, R. (2002) Deposit Insurance and Market
Assessment of Bank System Stability: Evidence from Denmark. Iowa
State University, mimeo.
Caprio, G. (1997) Safe and Sound Banking in Developing Countries: We’re
not in Kansas Anymore. In Research in Financial Services: Public and
Private Policy, vol. 9. George G. Kaufman, ed. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Caprio, G. – Honohan, P. (1998) Beyond Capital Ideals: Restoring Bank
Stability. World Bank.
de Juan, Aristobulo (2002) PCA in International Practice. In Prompt Corrective
Action: Ten Years Later. G G Kaufman, ed. Amsterdam: JAI.
Demirguc-Kunt, A. – Detragiache, E. (1998) The Determinants of Banking
Crises: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries. IMF Staff
Papers, vol. 45:1.
Eisenbeis, R. – Wall, D. (2002) The Major Supervisory Initiatives Post
FDICIA: Are They Based on the Goals of PCA? Should They Be? In
Prompt Corrective Action: Ten Years Later, G.G. Kaufman, ed. Amsterdam:
JAI.
Evanoff, D.D. – Wall, L.D. (2000) Subordinated Debt and Bank Capital
Reform. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 00-7.
Goodhart, C. – Hartmann, P. – Llewellyn, D. – Rojas-Suarez, L. – Weisbrod, S.
(1999)  Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? London:
Routledge.
Gruben, W.C. – Koo, J. – Moore, R.R. (2002) When Does Financial
Liberalization Make Banks Risky? An Empirical Examination of
Argentina, Canada and Mexico. In Prompt Corrective Action in Banking:
10 Years Later, George G. Kaufman, ed. Chicago, IL: Elsevier Science.
Guttentag, J. – Herring, R. (1983) The Lender of Last Resort in an
International Context. Princeton Essays in International Finance no. 151.
Hämäläinen, P. – Hall, M. – Howcroft, B. (2003) Market Discipline: A
Theoretical Framework for Regulatory Policy Development. Paper at
Financial Management Association in Europe, Dublin, June.34
Lane, T.D. (1993) Market Discipline. IMF Staff Papers, 40 (March), 53–88.
Llewellyn, D.T. (2000) Some Lessons for Bank Regulation from Recent
Banking Crises. Open Economies Review, July, 58–94.
Llewellyn, D.T. (2002a) “Comment” in Prompt Corrective Action: Ten Years
Later. G.G. Kaufman, ed. Amsterdam: JAI, 321–333.
Llewellyn, D.T. (2002b) Alternative Approaches to Regulation and Corporate
Governance in Financial Firms. In Financial Risks, Stability and
Globalisation, Omotunde E.G. Johnson, ed. Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
Mayes, D.G. (1997) A Market Based Approach to Maintaining Systemic
Stability. Bank of Finland Discussion Paper 18/97.
Mayes, D.G. – Halme, L. – Liuksila, A. (2001) Improving Banking Supervision.
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Mayes, D.G. – Liuksila, A. (2003) Who Pays for Bank Insolvency?
Basingstoke: Palgrave (forthcoming).
Miller, G.P. (1999) Deposit Insurance for Economies in Transition. In Bank
Failures and Bank Insolvency Law in Economies in Transition. R.M. Lastra
and H.N. Schiffman, eds. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law
International, 37–70.
Morgan, D.P. – Stiroh, K. (2000) Bond Market Discipline of Banks: Is the
Market Tough Enough? Mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Ridpath, B. (2003) Challenges for EU Banks in the Implementation of the New
Accord. Paper presented at CEPS meeting on The New Basel Capital Accord
and the Future of the European Financial System, Brussels, May.
Soifer, R. (2002) What Investors Really Want to Know: Thoughts on Pillar 3.
In Bumps on the Road to Basel: An Anthology of Views on Basel 2, CSFI,
London.BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online
1/2003 Tanai Khiaonarong  Payment systems efficiency, policy approaches, and the
role of the central bank. 2003. 69 p. ISBN 952-462-025-1, print; ISBN 952-
462-026-X, online. (TU)
2/2003 Iftekhar Hasan – Heiko Schmiedel  Do networks in the stock exchange
industry pay off? European evidence. 2003. 44 p. ISBN 952-462-027-8, print;
ISBN 952-462-028-6, online. (TU)
3/2003 Johanna Lukkarila  Aasian, Venäjän ja Turkin rahoituskriisien vertailua.
2003. 57 p. ISBN 952-462-029-4, print; ISBN 952-462-030-8, online. (KT)
4/2003 Samu Peura – Esa Jokivuolle  Simulation-based stress testing of banks’
regulatory capital adequacy. 2003. 41 p. ISBN 952-462-035-9, print;
ISBN 952-462-036-7, online. (RM)
5/2003 Peik Granlund  Economic evaluation of bank exit regimes in US, EU and
Japanese financial centres. 2003. 60 p. ISBN 952-462-037-5, print;
ISBN 952-462-038-3, online. (TU)
6/2003 Tuomas Takalo – Otto Toivanen  Equilibrium in financial markets with
adverse selection. 2003. 45 p. ISBN 952-462-039-1, print; ISBN 952-462-040-
5, online. (TU)
7/2003 Harry Leinonen  Restructuring securities systems processing – a blue print
proposal for real-time/t+0 processing. 2003. 90 p. ISBN 952-462-041-3,
print; ISBN 952-462-042-1, online. (TU)
8/2003 Hanna Jyrkönen – Heli Paunonen  Card, Internet and mobile payments in
Finland. 2003. 45 p. ISBN 952-462-043-X, print; ISBN 952-462-044-8, online.
(RM)
9/2003 Lauri Kajanoja  Money as an indicator variable for monetary policy when
money demand is forward looking. 2003. 35 p. ISBN 952-462-047-2, print;
ISBN 952-462-048-0, online. (TU)
10/2003 George W. Evans – Seppo Honkapohja  Friedman’s money supply rule vs
optimal interest rate policy. 2003. 22 p. ISBN 952-462-049-9, print; ISBN
952-462-050-2, online. (TU)11/2003 Anssi Rantala  Labour market flexibility and policy coordination in a
monetary union. 2003. 48 p. ISBN 952-462-055-3, print;
ISBN 952-462-056-1, online. (TU)
12/2003 Alfred V. Guender  Optimal discretionary monetary policy in the open
economy: Choosing between CPI and domestic inflation as target variables.
2003. 54 p. ISBN 952-462-057-X, print; ISBN 952-462-058-8, online. (TU)
13/2003 Jukka Vauhkonen  Banks’ equity stakes in borrowing firms: A corporate
finance approach. 2003. 34 p. ISBN 952-462-059-6, print;
ISBN 952-462-060-X, online. (TU)
14/2003 Jukka Vauhkonen  Financial contracts and contingent control rights. 2003.
33 p. ISBN 952-462-061-8, print; ISBN 952-462-062-6, online. (TU)
15/2003 Hanna Putkuri  Cross-country asymmetries in euro area monetary
transmission: the role of national financial systems. 114 p.
ISBN 952-462-063-4, print; ISBN 952-462-064-2, online. (RM)
16/2003 Kari Kemppainen  Competition and regulation in European retail payment
systems. 69 p. ISBN 952-462-065-0, print; ISBN 952-462-066-9, online. (TU)
17/2003 Ari Hyytinen – Tuomas Takalo  Investor protection and business creation.
32 p. ISBN 952-462-069-3, print; ISBN 952-462-070-7, online. (TU)
18/2003 Juha Kilponen  A positive theory of monetary policy and robust control.
26 p. ISBN 952-462-071-5, print; ISBN 952-462-072-3, online. (TU)
19/2003 Erkki Koskela – Rune Stenbacka  Equilibrium unemployment under
negotiated profit sharing. 28 p. ISBN 952-462-073-1, print; ISBN 952-462-
074-X, online. (TU)
20/2003 Eric Schaling  Learning, inflation expectations and optimal monetary
policy. 49 p. ISBN 952-462-075-8, print; ISBN 952-462-076-6, online. (TU)
21/2003 David T. Llewellyn – David G. Mayes  The role of market discipline in
handling problem banks. 34 p. ISBN 952-462-077-4,
print; ISBN 952-462-078-2, online. (TU)